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This article draws attention to certain features of Edmund Husserl’s theory of evidence and truth which, 
on closer look, reveal how his thoughts on the nature of experience and cognition are current and 
relevant even in the early 21st century. Many of his contemporaries and subsequent authors considered 
Husserl to be a late representative of traditional, modernist metaphysics—an idealist, a foundationalist, 
and an intellectualist, etc. The publication of his vast unpublished manuscripts has evidently dispelled 
such charges, and a thorough and attentive perusal of his published works (or works prepared for 
publication) clearly shows how highly problematic such charges were. In the article I aim to highlight 
the contextualist character of Husserl’s understanding of evidence and truth, of knowledge and Being. 
Every insight and every entity in his thought fits into a wider context of further experiences, insights, 
and entities. This conception is manifest at every level of his experience and knowledge: (1) everyday 
experiences, (2) scientific and (3) philosophical cognition. The evidence at every level is fundamentally 
open and contextual, and their correlation constitutes an essentially organic reality. With such 
formulations Husserl says something quite similar to what is now found under the label ‘epistemic 
contextualism’ in contemporary analytic philosophy. Next to the contextual character of evidence, the 
second main thesis of my essay is that Husserl’s stance in this question might serve as a fruitful field of 
dialogue between phenomenology and analytic philosophy.
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Данная статья акцентирует определенные характерные черты теории очевидности и истины 
Эдмунда Гуссерля, которые, при ближайшем рассмотрении, подтверждают актуальность его 
воззрений на природу опыта и познания даже в начале 21-го столетия. Многие современни-
ки и последователи считали Гуссерля поздним представителем традиционной модернистской 
метафизики — идеалистом, эпистемологическим фундаменталистом, интеллектуалистом и т. д. 
Издание его обширных неопубликованных рукописей развеяло эти заблуждения, а  внима-
тельное прочтение его опубликованных трудов (или работ, подготовленных к  публикации) 
наглядно демонстрирует безосновательность подобных упреков. Данная статья стремится 
подчеркнуть контекстуалистский характер гуссерлевского понимания очевидности и истины, 
познания и бытия. Любая мысль и любая сущность в его философии вписывается в более ши-
рокий контекст других опытов, мыслей и  сущностей. Эта концепция проявляется на любом 
уровне опыта и познания: в повседневном опыте, в научном опыте и в философском познании. 
На каждом уровне очевидность имеет принципиально открытый и  контекстуальный харак-
тер, а корреляция между ними, по существу, представляет собой органическую реальность. Тем 
самым Гуссерль утверждает нечто подобное тому, что можно обнаружить в так называемом 
«эпистемическом контекстуализме» в современной аналитической философии. Наряду с кон-
текстуальным характером очевидности, второй тезис данной работы заключается в том, что 
позиция Гуссерля по данному вопросу может открыть поле для диалога между феноменологией 
и аналитической философией.
Ключевые слова: Эдмунд Гуссерль, нефундаментализм, контестуализм, очевидность, аподик-
тичность, истина, феноменологическая метафизика.
INTRODUCTION
It would be hard to deny that the problem of evidence and truth was of central 
importance for the philosophy of Edmund Husserl. Perhaps the most important aim of 
his entire life-career was to offer a strictly scientific basis for philosophical researches; 
and to clarify the conditions of absolutely grounded, indubitable philosophical 
insights. He aimed to reach the realm of ultimate philosophical evidence and truth. 
His final aim was to secure an ultimate foundation (Letztbegründung) for scientific and 
* Статья была поддержана исследовательской стипендией Яноша Боляя Венгерской Акаде-
мии наук (проект: BO/00421/18/2).
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particularly philosophical cognition (Erkenntnis). In his view the genuine, ultimately 
founded philosophical insight (and theory) should be apodictic (in the philosophical 
sense of the word); that is to say, the evidence which accompanies those insights must 
be absolute, indubitable and incorrigible. According to him apodictic evidence should 
be the ultimate foundation for every form of cognition and knowledge1.
Husserl thought he finally managed to fulfil the dream of Kant, and he set the 
philosophy on the road of becoming a strict, rigorous science (e.g. Husserl, 1971, 159–
160; Husserl, 1989, 427). He laid down the proper attitude, method and principles 
of phenomenological philosophy, which were supposed to yield universally valid, 
objective, unquestionable results. He believed philosophy was soon to start its steady, 
unbound, linear and infinite progress as a normal and ultimately grounding science, 
with endless accumulation of strictly scientific theses. He never gave up this idea of 
philosophy as a “rigorous science” (Husserl, 1976b, 508; Husserl, 1970b, 389 ff.)2. The 
first, superficial look on the history of phenomenological movement during and after 
Husserl’s life-time should make it evident that things happened in a radically different 
way than Husserl had originally imagined. 
The phenomenological movement looks like a jungle. Almost every major 
figure of this movement has her or his own phenomenological philosophy, with its 
own peculiar vocabulary, problem-field, way of approach, treatment of things, etc. 
All phenomenologies look very different. There are only a few common points in 
them: such as “intentionality” and “philosophical analysis of experience” (cf. Gondek 
& Tengelyi, 2011, 9–40). From a certain point of view Ricœur was right to say that “the 
history of phenomenology is the history of Husserlian heresies” (Ricœur, 1987, 9). 
Husserl himself had to witness—with an ever-greater disappointment—that his most 
talented followers (as Max Scheler, then Martin Heidegger) chose a radically different 
1 Marco Cavallaro’s remark to this sentence: “Actually, he revised this idea in the last period, 
arguing that apodictic evidence is still the principle of philosophical knowledge, meaning absolute 
knowledge, but not for every form of knowledge. Life-worldly knowledge is relative, and it is good 
being so. It would make no sense to try to give an absolute foundation to relative, life-worldly 
knowledge.”
2 As the remaining part of the first paragraph of Beilage XVII of Husserliana 6 makes it clear, the 
famous first words (“Philosophy as science, as serious, rigorous, indeed apodictically rigorous, 
science—the dream is over”) do not express Husserl’s own opinion, but some of his contemporaries: 
“But these times are over—such is the generally reigning opinion of such people.”
 Marco Cavallaro: “Carr says in his Translator’s Introduction: ‘It is clear from the context that Husserl was 
attributing this view to his age, not asserting it himself ’ (Carr, 1970). Translator’s Introduction. In The 
Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological 
Philosophy, XV–XLIII. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, p. XXXI, n. 21).”
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understanding of phenomenology than he originally had in mind. He expressed 
his grief concerning the “desertion” of his earlier fellow-phenomenologists in such 
phrases: “I am a leader without followers” (Husserl, 1994a, 182), and: I am the greatest 
enemy of the famous “phenomenological movement” (Husserl, 1994c, 79) (cf. Moran, 
2002, 2).
There are nearly as many phenomenologies as are phenomenologists: this does 
not really sound as a properly functioning normal science. What can we say after 
all the Husserlian idea of phenomenology with a uniform, coherent methodology, 
reaching the ultimate truth, yielding absolutely firm, unquestionable, infallible, 
apodictic insights? Does not such an idea remain a mere dream? How Husserl exactly 
understood this dream, this idea? This is the main topic of this study.
* * *
According to the classical interpretation, Edmund Husserl was one of the last 
great representatives of a bygone great epoch: that of modernity, and particularly of 
the Enlightenment. This was the approach many of Husserl’s students and followers 
took to their master (most prominently Scheler and Heidegger)—and several gener-
ations of phenomenologists and philosophers long after Husserl’s death. They appre-
ciated Husserl’s concrete treatment of things (the famous slogan: “Back to the things 
themselves!”)3, his earlier realist commitment (in Logical Investigations), his concep-
tion of intentionality, the categorical analysis of experience, etc. But they considered 
him (and his philosophy) to be intellectualist (Scheler, Heidegger, etc.), after his “tran-
scendental turn”: idealist (the Munich School of phenomenology, Scheler, Heidegger, 
etc.), one-sidedly, naively rationalist (Scheler, Heidegger, etc.), foundationalist (Rich-
ard Rorty); who propagated the epistemic and ontological precedence of conscious-
ness over Being or real existence (Heidegger, etc.) and who believed in an uncritical 
manner in linear progress in history (Derrida). 
This has been a classical interpretation by many of Husserl’s contemporaries, 
students, followers, colleagues, and many phenomenologists and philosophers after 
Husserl, including some professional researchers of his philosophy and philosophical 
legacy. In the last few decades this picture has slowly started to change: most impor-
tantly amongst Husserl researchers, and bit by bit representatives of a wider philoso-
pher audience have also begun to read and conceive of Husserl’s thought in a different 
way. Slowly we commence to realize how radically contemporaneous Husserl is, how 
3 See: (Husserl, 1984, 10; Husserl, 2001b, 168). 
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far he was ahead of his own age. This change was due first of all to the publication 
of his manuscripts; but the release of these earlier unpublished texts inevitably con-
firmed that even those works which were published or were prepared for publication 
in Husserl’s life (such as Logical Investigations, Ideas…4, Formal and Transcendental 
Logic, Cartesian Meditations, Crisis…5 and Experience and Judgement) did not fit into 
this picture. According to the altered interpretative context, Husserl was no intellec-
tualist (Nam-In Lee), no idealist (Tengelyi), no foundationalist (Drummond, Stein-
bock); he was not a naïve philosopher of consciousness in the traditional sense of the 
word (Lee), he did not believe uncritically in the linear progress of history (Varga). He 
was rather a hermeneutic philosopher, especially in his later period (Luft, Heffernan, 
Reeder, Hermberg, etc.). We begin to recognize that openness, non-linearity, circulari-
ty6, retroactivity, diachrony, existentialist motifs7, contextuality are essential character-
istics of his mature philosophy. 
We are now beginning to see how topical Husserl’s phenomenology is in our 
present day; as Heffernan phrased it how “phenomenological philosophy is fully in 
step with the Zeitgeist” (Heffernan, 2009, 31). In my interpretation the classical ter-
minology and classical articulation of classical problems hid much of the real depth 
of the radical novelty of Husserl’s thought for many of his students and followers, and 
also for many representatives of the later generations. We begin to see how flexible 
Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy is, how easily and fruitfully it can adapt and 
integrate modern scientific results from both the human and the natural sciences, 
and how creatively it can utilize them in a philosophical way. In this paper I aim to 
contribute to the unfolding of the philosophical potentialities of Husserl’s thoughts 
and legacy.
I divided this study to four main parts. In the first section I aim to treat some 
fundamental features of epistemic contextualism. The topic of the second section is 
the main types and levels of evidence in Husserl; in the third section I analyse the re-
lationship of apodictic evidence and corrigibility. In the final part I take a closer look 
at the effects of Husserl’s contextualist conception of evidence on his idea of phenom-
enological metaphysics. 
4 Reference is made to Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philoso-
phy, first book: general introduction to a pure phenomenology (Husserl, 1976a; Husserl, 1983). 
5 Reference is made to The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. An Intro-
duction to Phenomenological Philosophy (Husserl, 1976b; Husserl, 1970b).
6 See: (Varga, 2011, 105).
7 Cf. (Loidolt, 2011). See also: (Cavallaro, 2019; Cavallaro & Heffernan, 2020).
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1. EPISTEMIC CONTEXTUALISM AS A POSSIBLE POINT OF  
DIALOGUE BETWEEN PHENOMENOLOGY AND  
ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
Many interpreters and researchers have already realized that Husserl had 
enough philosophical potential even to mediate in the greatest schism of our 
present-day philosophy: namely, in the opposition of continental and analytic 
philosophy. Some thought that Husserl’s notion of “noema” could be such a mediatory 
concept (Drummond, 1990). Others highlighted the close connection between the 
phenomenological approach of mind and analytic philosophy of mind (Gallagher & 
Zahavi, 2008). I choose Husserl’s notion and theory of evidence and truth (as a possible 
source of mediation between continental and analytic philosophy), which show strong 
resemblances to the analytic position of epistemic contextualism (e.g. Black, 2003; 
DeRose, 2009; Rysiew, 2016). There is at least one precedence of interpreting Husserl’s 
philosophy as a sort of contextualism (Thompson, 2014)8. In my opinion, however, 
there is still a lot to tell in this regard. It is also a way of approach that could highlight 
some essential features of Husserl’s conception of evidence and truth.
The aim of this essay is not to make a systematic comparison of Husserl and 
epistemic contextualism, but to show a possibly fruitful field of communication 
between phenomenology and analytic philosophy. Thus here we will treat only some 
basic elements of epistemic contextualism. “Epistemic contextualism is a recent and 
hotly debated position” in analytic philosophy (Rysiew, 2016). According to this view-
point, every piece of knowledge, every judgement is relative to a context, and gains 
its meaning and proper truth-value within the frames of a wider web of (also social 
and practical) relationships. Some authors (Annis, 1978; Williams, 1991)  regard 
such philosophers as Austin, Dewey, Pierce, Popper and Wittgenstein as the most 
important predecessors of contextualism (even though it can be traced back to Hegel 
in an explicit form). As an explicit, well-articulated philosophical stance it emerged 
in the late 1970s and 1980s, in authors such as David Annis, David Lewis, Gail Stine 
and Stuart Cohen. It became an influential, wide-spread standpoint during the 1990s.
Contextualist theory of knowledge was partly elaborated in order to answer 
sceptical challenges to the conditions of knowledge and cognition. It serves to secure 
the claims of knowledge and cognition under certain conditions. The paradigmatic 
example of sceptic arguments (against which contextualist authors attempt to secure 
knowledge) is the “Brains in a Vat” argument, according to which we are bodiless 
8 In the book by Dan Zahavi and Shaun Gallagher the contextualist character of Husserl’s philosophy 
is also a very emphatic motif.
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brains in a vat, experiencing a virtual reality, generated by a computer (or computers). 
(We can also think of Descartes’ “Evil Demon” argument. In many texts dealing with 
contextualism, this type of argument is formally referred to as “Sceptic Argument” 
[SA]). Take the following syllogism: P1: “I don’t know whether I am not a brain in a 
vat,” P2: “If I don’t know whether I am a brain in a vat, then I don’t know whether I 
have hands or not,” C: “I don’t know whether I have hands.” Contextualism—amongst 
others—tries to answer such extreme forms of scepticism (represented by the “Brains 
in a Vat” or “Evil Demon” arguments). Contextualism attempts to do so in several 
different ways.
According to contextualism “know” is an indexical term—like “here” or “I.” Its 
semantic content (or meaning) therefore “depends on the context in which it is used” 
(Black, 2003). If its semantic content is dependent on the content, then the sceptical 
argument “Brain in a Vat” (or something similar) cannot rule out that I legitimately 
say “I know that I have hands,” because these two sentences imply drastically different 
contexts; the second one is the context of ordinary praxis of everyday life, the first 
one the context of speculative philosophical theory. Those two contexts have radically 
different sets of epistemic standards: the second one has low, while the first one very 
high standards. The means and methods of justification are also dependent on the 
particular practical and epistemic (semantic) context. 
Michael Williams in a paper argues that sceptical argument is unnatural; nothing 
motivates in our everyday praxis and epistemic context to support the hypothetical 
constructions of extreme scepticism (Williams, 1999). According to him it is the duty 
of scepticism to prove its sceptical claims; but it fails to do so; thus we have no reason to 
take scepticism seriously. This argument is compatible with evidentialism (according 
to which one is justified to believe something if one has evidence to support his or her 
belief), which could be also a version of contextualism9. Such a concept of evidence 
(and the contextual nature of evidence as such) shows a strong similarity to the way 
how Husserl was thinking of evidence. In Husserl’s opinion we have no reason to 
doubt an evidence based belief or judgment, till we receive some other information, 
which make our earlier belief problematic (cf. Reeder, 1990; Drummond, 1990, 245–
247; Hermberg, 2006, 30 ff.). 
The closer analysis shows that Husserl’s own position could be characterized also 
as a kind of contextualism—from Logical Investigations (1900/01) to his latest works 
(it appears also in earlier manuscripts). In his approach every experience, insight and 
judgement takes place within a context, in the context of other experiences, insights 
9 Stewart Cohen presents a contextualist form of evidentialism. See, e.g. (Cohen, 1988).
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and judgements, and has to be interpreted with regard to this context. The context 
of experiences, evidences and judgements mirrors the inherent contextuality of 
Being; its organic, dynamic, ever forming, processual character. There are no separate 
elements—neither in experience and cognition (Erkenntnis), nor in Being. 
In Husserl’s thought, every level of experience and evidence should be described 
as essentially contextual. On the level of sensuous experience, the new sensual data 
always shed a new light on the concrete individual thing and case of affair. On the level 
of categorical intuitions and vision of essences (Wesensschau), the essences turn out to 
be in an essential, mutual, network-like relationship with each other, and, eventually, 
all essences are proven to be principally open. Evidence and truth, on the individual as 
well as on the general level (on the level of essences), is always open and contextual. In 
this essay I intend to elaborate some consequences of this view. 
2. LEVELS AND TYPES OF EVIDENCE
2.1. General notion of evidence in Husserl
Despite his anti-metaphysical point of departure (Husserl, 1968, 253) Husserl’s 
final aim with phenomenology is metaphysical: he wants to answer, or at least to 
elaborate, the “ultimate and highest” or “supreme and final” questions of philosophy 
and of life in general (e.g. Husserl, 1973c, 165; Husserl, 1960, 138; Husserl, 1968, 299; 
Husserl, 1997, 177). He would like to find answer, or at least to find the right pathway 
to the answer, to questions concerning God, an apodictic ethics, the meaning and 
direction of history, the fate of soul before the birth and after death, and questions 
like that. But Husserl starts from the bottom level: from the level of practical, natural 
attitude, with its unreflected, naïve life and experiences. As a starting-point he begins 
with concrete, simple experiences of objects and everyday situations (the experience 
of a cube, a tree, a car on the street, the voice of a violin, etc.). In Husserl’s opinion there 
are several, well separable levels of experience, cognition (Erkenntnis) and reflection—
but there is always a well reconstructable linearity between those levels. The question 
is: how do we get from the perception of a cube to the problem of existence of God 
and immortality of the soul?
In Husserl’s view there are three major, principal levels of experience and 
cognition: natural, scientific and philosophical level (The two latter belong to the 
sphere of theoretical attitude, however, Husserl considers the philosophical position 
to be more radical than the positive scientific). They are based upon each other, and 
they represent an increasingly radical form of reflexivity. The genesis of a higher level 
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from the lower could be interpreted as a process of radicalization of reflexivity. There 
are rudimentary, seminal forms (proto-forms) of reflection even on the level of natural 
attitude, and the radicalization of such reflections necessarily leads to higher levels and 
forms of reflection. There is almost an unbroken, continuous, linear order and hierarchy 
of reflections in Husserl’s philosophy. The highest form of reflection (and reflective 
attitude) is the phenomenological (e.g. Husserl, 1976a, 133; Husserl, 1983, 142; Husserl, 
1976b, 502 ff.). As Husserl told it: “Phenomenology was the secret desire [Sehnsucht] of 
all modern philosophy” (e.g. Husserl, 1976a, 133; Husserl, 1983, 142; trans. mod.).
Evidence is a form of seeing (or experiencing—in the wide sense of the word). 
In Husserl’s interpretation, reflection is also a sort of seeing or experiencing (phenom-
enological reflection is also a kind of seeing or experiencing things). Seeing and ex-
periencing (especially in their reflexive form) are the universal medium of cognition 
on every level. Seeing and experiencing are striving after to be evident, in order to be a 
reliable source and foundation of knowledge. Evidence, in Husserl’s view, is not a feel-
ing of truth or reliability, not a mystical “index veri”—as opposed to the psychologist 
interpretation of evidence in Husserl’s age, and also in contrast with some Kantian 
explanations (cf. Heffernan, 1999)—, but an act-character of intentional fulfilment, 
of fulfilling empty presentations with intuition. Truth belongs to the objective side 
of evident experience, as the evidently experienced object or situation in its bodily 
presence. Evidence belongs to the noetic side of experience, truth to the noematic. In 
Husserl’s description, every single noesis and noema is surrounded by sophisticated 
context (an open horizon) of other noeses and noemas. 
An important characteristic of evidence is that it could be crossed out. An ev-
ident perception may turn out to be false or at least one-sided, in the light of newer 
perceptions. A well-known, oft-cited example in Husserl’s work to such a case is found 
in the Fifth Logical Investigation:
Let us discuss the matter more closely in the light of a concrete example. Wandering 
about in the Panopticum Waxworks we meet on the stairs a charming lady whom we 
do not know and who seems to know us, and who is in fact the well-known joke of the 
place: we have for a moment been tricked by a waxwork figure. As long as we are tricked, 
we experience a perfectly good percept: we see a lady and not a waxwork figure. When 
the illusion vanishes, we see exactly the opposite, a waxwork figure that only represents a 
lady. (Husserl, 1984, 458–459; Husserl, 2001b, 137–138) 
The question arises: is there an evidence that cannot be crossed out? One that 
counts as ultimately valid, absolutely founded, which is infallible and incorrigible10? 
10 Marco Cavallaro’s remark to this question. “I would also add that for Husserl the existence of an 
absolute evidence is the condition of possibility of philosophical knowledge, since he identifies 
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According to Husserl such evidence is apodictic. But later (in Formal and Transcendental 
Logic) he said that even apodictic evidence is corrigible and fallible (Husserl, 1974, 
164; cf. Heffernan, 2009). What can be told about the relationship of evidence and 
corrigibility (and absoluteness, infallibility)? Is there an ultimately incorrigible 
evidence? Does that not imply dogmatism? 
2.2. Main types of evidence and their relationship
In Ideas (1913), Husserl mentions four basic types of evidence: apodictic 
and assertoric, adequate and inadequate (Husserl, 1976a, §§ 137–138). Assertoric 
is hypothetical, conditional and could be crossed out; apodictic is unconditional 
and infallible. Inadequate evidence could be completed, it is open, partial and one-
sided; adequate evidence is entirely complete, closed, full and cannot receive further 
completion. From the publication of Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891)  till the Crisis 
(1936) and the last manuscripts Husserl’s overall theory of evidence went through 
a complicated and nuanced development. But—at least in my interpretation—there 
are two fundamental questions of Husserl’s conception: 1) could apodictic evidence 
somehow be corrected or overwritten? 2) could adequate evidence really reached and 
realized—in actu?
Evidence, in Husserl’s view, is strongly intertwined with his theory of experience 
and intuition. According to the “principle of all principles,” the ultimate and only 
legitimizing source of every possible cognition is the “originary presentive intuition” 
(„originär gebende Anschauung“) (Husserl, 1976a, 51; Husserl, 1983, 44). In his 
opinion there are two levels of intuition: individual and general. We are capable of 
intuiting essences, not only individual things. Husserl calls this general intuition the 
intuition of essences or eidetic vision11. The intuition of individual things is accompanied 
by assertoric evidence. It is open, fallible, and corrigible. And there is always more to 
learn about an individual thing or case: the latter has inner and outer horizons. It is 
always inadequate. The intuition of essences is apodictic, it is infallible. The more 
interesting question is whether it is adequate or inadequate. There are two major 
sorts of essences: material or regional and formal essences (Husserl, 1976a, §§ 1–17). 
Material essences refer to great realms of things in the real world with regard to their 
philosophy with the Kantian idea of absolute, apodictic knowledge. In other terms, he’s not asking 
whether there is such a thing like apodictic evidence, but he deduces the existence of apodictic 
evidence from the philosophical ideal of absolute knowledge.”
11 Its earlier form in the Logical Investigations is “categorical intuition”, more precisely, “abstractive 
categorical intuition.” On this, see: (Lohmar, 2008).
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species: such as human beings, animals, plants, merely physical things, etc. There 
are three such general realms of the real world: the physical, biological and spiritual-
cultural level of reality (Ideas II) (Husserl, 1952)12. Formal essences refer to logical 
categories and relationships—they concern a thing merely as a thing. The intuition of 
material essences turns out to be inadequate. There are always more things to learn 
about material essences, with scientific discoveries, they could always be completed 
(cf. Smith, 2007, 143–144). For Husserl the intuition of formal essences seems to be 
adequate.
There is also a further, more important distinction in this context: the difference 
between immanent and transcendent perception13. Transcendent perception is directed 
to concrete transcendent things or states of affairs. Immanent perception is a sort of 
reflection: it is related to live experiences and to its moments, such as sensations. For 
the first instance: transcendent perception is characterized by inadequacy, immanent 
perception by adequacy. But a closer look at Husserl’s own words reveal that the situation 
is somehow more complicated. Yes, transcendent perception is always inadequate. In 
Logical Investigations he said that inner perception is adequate. But in Ideas he writes: 
“It is the case also of mental process [Erlebnis] that it is never perceived completely, 
that it cannot be adequately seized upon in its full unity” (Husserl, 1976a, 93; Husserl, 
1983, 97). It seems so that Husserl’s position after the Logical Investigations, in Lectures 
on the Phenomenology of Consciousness of Internal Time (1904/05) has changed. Thus, 
it looks like that even the object of immanent perception cannot be given adequately 
either. But the situation is not so simple: after Ideas, there are textual places in Bernau 
Manuscripts (1917/18) and Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis (1918–
1926) according to which we can grasp the sensation, the hyletic data adequately 
in reflection. Consequently, Husserl seems to hesitate. But from 1929  the situation 
became quite unambiguous: even sensations cannot be given adequately. Such was the 
approach of texts like Cartesian Meditations, Formal and Transcendental Logic, Crisis, 
Experience and Judgement and C-Manuscripts.
And what is about intuition of essences? After 1925 it is firm and evident for 
Husserl that the evidence of material essences is inadequate, the essence of the world as 
such is something infinitely open (texts of Husserliana 41, fifth editorial division). He 
allows the possibility that some very simple formal essences can be grasped adequately 
12 Marco Cavallaro’s comment: “This is Stein’s interpretation. In Husserl there are but two universal 
regions: nature and spirit.”
13 The terminology of Ideas. Earlier, in Logical Investigations, Husserl used the terms (following 
Brentano) internal and external perception, which he felt less accurate in Ideas.
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(in Formal and Transcendental Logic)14; but from 1929 onwards, adequate evidence 
became a governing idea which “lies in infinity” (Cartesian Meditations, Experience 
and Judgement, etc.). Not even the proper themes of transcendental reflection—the 
structures of constituting transcendental subjectivity—can be given adequately, they are 
topics of an infinitely open research project. They are transcendental, yet material 
essences. Essences, both formal and material, are in a universal nexus with each other, 
they make up an infinitely open context; both on the horizon of mundane, positive 
sciences and on the field of transcendental phenomenology.
3. APODICTICITY AND CORRIGIBILITY
3.1. The possibility to reinterpret apodicticity
In Husserl’s view one of the most important features of phenomenology is crit-
icism and self-criticism. One must always be open to criticism of other fellow philos-
ophers (fellow phenomenologists), and be ready to correct earlier judgements and 
insights, if one later recognizes them to be false or one-sided. The scientific attitude, 
and more precisely: the phenomenological position is inherently critical. What does 
the correction of an evident experience mean? We can think of the example of the 
waxwork figure in the Logical Investigations: we see a charming, young lady, then, a 
minute later, we realize it is a mannequin made of waxwork. But what is the case with 
apodictic evidences, whose essential feature is incorrigibility? What can we mean with 
a correction of such an absolute evidence? Husserl defines such an evidence in the 
following way:
An apodictic evidence, however, is not merely certainty of the affairs or affair complexes 
(states of affairs) evident in it: rather it discloses itself, to a critical reflection, as 
having the signal peculiarity of being at the same time the absolute unimaginableness 
(inconceivability) of their non-being, and thus excluding in advance every doubt as 
“objectless,” empty. (Husserl, 1973c; Husserl, 1960, 15 ff.)
14 Husserl, in Formal and Transcendental Logic, on the field of mathematics and logics, supports the 
project of complete axiomatization of mathematics of David Hilbert. He—Husserl—thought that 
every true mathematical judgement could be derived from a closed, finite set of axioms. This view 
was obviously at odds with the conception of open contextuality, and was later refuted by Kurt 
Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. Husserl in this regard was wrong, but phenomenology could be 
corrected due to its intrinsic character of self-criticism and self-correction.
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Hence, what is the point of self-criticism, or of intersubjective revision in the 
case of such an evidence, which is defined from the very beginning as infallible and 
incorrigible? Husserl attributes such apodictic evidence to phenomenological reflec-
tion. What are the concrete examples of this evidence? “I am,” “I think,” “ego sum,” 
“ego cogito.” Apodictically evident is the existence of the concrete lived experience 
(Erlebnis), e.g.: “I am seeing an apple.” Perhaps I am wrong claiming that there is an 
apple in real, outside of experience, independent from my consciousness. It can be 
a dream, a hallucination, or the apple is not a real fruit, it is actually a piece of art, a 
painted porcelain. But I cannot be wrong that “I am seeing an apple,” about the ex-
istence of the concrete lived experience as such—only concerning its transcendent 
correlate. How could such apodictic evidences be corrected or modified? What does 
correction or modification mean in this case? 
The duty of philosophy in this case would be nothing else than an infinite gath-
ering of such apodictic insights; it would be an infinite, plain linear and cumulative 
project. There was not be any retroactivity, non-linearity—it would be an infinite, 
ceaseless enterprise in the manner of 18th century Enlightenment15. But phenomenol-
ogy in Husserl’s thought is, eventually, no such a project. His own vision on phenom-
enological movement as a historical scientific enterprise is quite different from the 
classical views on scientific development which we could find in the age of Enlight-
enment (e.g. in Condorcet). Namely, Husserl leaves open the possibility of retroactive 
reinterpretation of apodictic insights and judgement, the possibility of their further com-
pletion. In this respect the relationship between adequacy and apodicticity is extreme-
ly important. Every new apodictic insight sheds new light on earlier insights. We are 
speaking about a synchronically and diachronically organizing, dynamic network of 
apodictic insights, which evoke the picture of a living organism, rather than a me-
chanically and monotonously growing list of scientific theses. 
3.2. Interpretations on Husserl’s notion of apodicticity
Among Husserl interpreters there is a long tradition of treating the problem 
of the absoluteness of apodicticity, in order to avoid dogmatism (in order to avoid 
interpreting Husserl as a dogmatic philosopher). Drummond, for example, speaks 
about “limited apodicticity” in this context. According to him, an insight is apodictic 
when there is no reason to doubt (Drummond, 1990, 245). But this does not mean that 
15 Like in Marquis de Condorcet, who in his work Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the 
Human Mind (1794) expressed the general intellectual attitude of the mainstream of Enlightenment 
in a very illustrative way.
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apodicticity is absolutely infallible and incorrigible. Following José Huertas-Jourda, 
Reeder and Hermberg, in the same manner, speak about de jure and de facto apodicticity 
(Huertas-Jourda, 1983; Reeder, 1990; Hermberg, 2006). De jure apodicticity means 
the evidence of original intuitive givenness, de facto apodicticity signifies the derived 
evidence of judgement, based upon the evidence of intuitive givenness. According 
to these philosophers de jure apodicticity is corrigible and potential theme of future 
criticism. Walter Hopp speaks about agent-fallibility and method-fallibility, implying 
that the method could be completely reliable, and we—notwithstanding—fallible, 
being finite beings (Hopp, 2009). Heffernan claims that Hopp’s analyses are one-
sidedly noetic, and he draws the attention on the noematic aspect of the problem, 
and speaks about object indeterminacy and evidence-fallibility, which two are rooted 
in the radical openness of every experience concerning the objects that surround us 
(Heffernan, 2009). Following these initiations, I would like to highlight the open and 
ultimately indeterminate character of apodictic evidence; namely, its original and 
inevitable contextuality. In this context I attribute special importance to the apodictic 
feature of intuition of essences, and the inherent inadequacy of the latter. Researches 
about essences are thus also infinite and open enterprises. 
In this regard, concerning the contextual and open nature of evidence (and 
especially apodicticity), I would like to draw the attention to the book of Saulius 
Geniusas The Origins of the Horizon in Husserl’s Phenomenology (2012), which is—in 
my opinion—of key importance with respect to this question. Geniusas analyses this 
problem from the point of view of Husserl’s conception of horizon; which the author 
treats as a peculiar structure of intentionality that has two, inseparably connected 
aspects: the horizon of constituting subjectivity and world-horizon (Geniusas, 
2012, 9). We could consider his book as a systematic attempt to reconcile apodictic 
evidence with the horizon structure of experience. According to Geniusas, there is a 
fundamental transformation of Husserl’s notion of apodicticity, around the time of 
the 1923/24 winter semester lecture First Philosophy. Earlier apodicticity was the idea 
of absolute evidence, which should be attained by the very beginning of philosophical 
reflection, through the implementation of phenomenological reduction. Geniusas 
emphasizes that Husserl never gave up the idea of apodictic grounding of knowledge 
(Geniusas, 2012, 133), but this sense of apodicticity changed by the time of First 
Philosophy. Apodicticity became a governingidea of philosophical researches that 
never could be fully realized (Geniusas, 2012, 119, 133). Apodicticity, in Geniusas’ 
interpretation, in the late Husserl is necessarily open, and embedded into a historical 
process; it is a part and ineliminable structural element of the transcendental and 
apriori history of constituting (inter)subjectivity.
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3.3. Apodicticity and historicity
As already indicated: in regard of Husserl’s “final” theory of evidence and truth, 
I think the central position of the problem of history in his late philosophy (in the 
1930s) has a special importance16. The process of experience and cognition (and thus, 
also evidence and truth) is embedded into history, intersubjectivity, practice and 
bodily existence. It is part of the life-world (Lebenswelt). According to Husserl’s late 
work, every evidence, including scientific and philosophic, is based upon the direct, 
familiar, relative evidences and truths of the life-world (Crisis, texts of Husserl (1973b, 
1992, 2008)). Scientific and philosophic evidence has its roots in the praxis of the life-
world. Furthermore, there is a circularity of evidences in the entire socio-historical 
world. Scientific and philosophic insights and results emerge from life-world practice 
which, during the course of history, slowly sink down into the soil of everyday, 
common world experience and caring.
The levels of cultural world (pre-theoretical, practical world, world of 
theoretical attitude, of science and philosophy) and their histories are strongly 
intertwined. Their evidences determine each other. Communication is a universal 
and fundamental medium of cultural world, of pre-theoretical world as well as of 
scientific world17. Communication plays an essential role in constituting science as a 
cultural and historical process. We articulate insights and evidences in intersubjective 
communication. Insights and evidences gain their strictly, rigorously scientific form 
in scientific discourse (cf. Sokolowski, 2008). Intersubjective criticism and possibility 
of critics is a constitutive feature of objective science, including philosophy. What 
can we tell about the possibility of criticizing apodictic evidence in scientific 
discourse? 
16 At once, we must add that the problem of history was important for him since 1907/08 at the latest; 
since manuscripts like B II 2 (partly published in (Husserl, 1973a, 2014)) and B I 4 (unpublished). 
From 1907/08 the question of history and historicity was of peculiar importance for him, (a pre-
eminent example of this importance are his lectures on First Philosophy (Husserl, 1956, 1959)). 
“History is the great fact of absolute Being” (Husserl, 1959, 506). 
 In this context one should also cite his famous letter to Georg Misch (27 November 1930): „Es 
wird sich, so denke ich, dann offenbaren, daß der ‚ahistorische Husserl‘ nur zeitweise Distanz von 
der Historie nehmen mußte (die er doch stets im Blicke hatte), gerade um in der Methode soweit 
kommen zu können, an sie wissenschaftliche Fragen zu stellen“ [“I think it will be then obvious that 
the ‘ahistorical Husserl’ had to distance himself from the history (which he always still had in mind) 
only at times, just to be able to reach the proper level of development in method, in order to raise 
scientific questions concerning it”] (Husserl, 1994b, 283 ff.). 
17 On this, see: (Mezei, 1995, 57–59).
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We see the world only from a finite, limited perspective. Thus, our insights and 
judgements concerning the world (and also concerning ourselves) will be necessarily 
finite, limited and one-sided. There are moments of the world we do not see from our 
perspective, but other people, other scientists do. As scientists, as philosophers, we 
study facts and essences. But both have infinite internal and external implications, 
which could only be grasped inadequately. In the scientific and philosophic theoretical 
praxis, apodictic evidence could relate to the examined facts and essences. This 
apodicticity is, however, necessarily incomplete and inadequate, and thus open to 
further (but never ultimate) completion. Apodicticity is always one-sided, and every 
single apodictic insight and registration is embedded into the open context of infinitely 
many further apodictic insights and registration. Every new apodictic insight could 
complete and reinterpret the nexus of the earlier ones. 
In every apodictic insight and experience there is a core meaning, which is 
infallible and incorrigible, yet also indeterminate and one-sided. The intersubjective 
criticism of apodicticity reveals the limited and one-sided nature of earlier results and 
insights. During the communicative, historical cognizing (Erkennen) the scientists 
and philosophers disclose subjectivity and world in a more and more concrete way, in 
an ever richer manner. The basis of this cognizing and cognition is a communicative, 
dynamic and open apodicticity, which mirrors the infinite complexity and openness 
of ourselves and the world. 
4. CONTEXTUALISM IN METAPHYSICS.  
THE “ULTIMATE AND HIGHEST QUESTIONS” OF PHILOSOPHY
Husserl analysed the inherent contextuality of experience and cognition on at 
least three different, main levels: (1) everyday experiences, (2) scientific knowledge 
and research of essences (Wesensforschung) and (3)  philosophical knowledge and 
cognition. On each level every piece of experience and knowledge shows a necessary, 
ineluctable interrelatedness and a radical openness. Every horizon of experience and 
knowledge is essentially open. This openness means (among others) that later infor-
mation could always reinterpret the earlier. Now we can answer the question (at least 
partially) we have raised earlier: “How do we get from the perception of a cube to the 
problem of existence of God and immortality of the soul?” How do we get from the 
level of perception of a cube to the “ultimate and highest questions,” to questions of 
traditional metaphysics—reinterpreted in a phenomenological manner? 
From about 1905 onwards to the end of his life, Husserl’s aim was to create a 
phenomenologically grounded metaphysics (as represented e.g. in the manuscript B 
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II 2 from 1907–1910)18. In Cartesian Meditations (1929) Husserl writes the following 
words:
Finally, lest any misunderstanding arise, I would point out that, as already stated, 
phenomenology indeed excludes every naive metaphysics that operates with absurd 
things in themselves, but does not exclude metaphysics as such. […] [W]ithin the de 
facto monadic sphere and (as an ideal possibility) within every conceivable monadic 
sphere, occur all the problems of accidental factualness, of death, of fate, of the possibility 
of a “genuine” human life demanded as “meaningful” in a particular sense among them, 
therefore, the problem of the “meaning” of history, and all the further and still higher 
problems. We can say that they are the ethico-religious problems, but stated in the realm 
where everything that can have a possible sense for us must be stated. (Husserl, 1973c, 
182; Husserl, 1960, 156)
Husserl always kept in mind the task of phenomenological re-grounding 
(Neubegründung) of traditional metaphysics, which is capable of giving apodictically 
evident answers to the “ultimate and highest questions” of the latter, and of philosophy 
as such. In the earlier parts of this essay we characterized Husserl’s philosophy as 
essentially contextualist. Now we should raise the question: what consequences 
this philosophical (and epistemological) stance has on his metaphysical conside- 
rations? 
According to Husserl, as we have seen, the ultimate source and basis of every 
legitimate knowledge is “originary presentive intuition” (Husserl, 1976a, § 24; Husserl, 
1983, § 24). This holds to everyday, scientific and philosophical knowledge (in its 
ultimately grounded form yielded by the phenomenological reflection) too. Husserl is 
also aware of the fact that the visible (what is originally present) is always surrounded 
by a halo of invisible, of what is not seen immediately. Those moments however, 
which are not seen directly, could be made visible in different ways. The problem is, 
in order to answer the classical metaphysical questions (or, at least, to elaborate those 
questions properly), at certain points we must inevitably transgress the boundaries 
of possible intuition. How then we are supposed to make a phenomenologically 
grounded, evidence-based metaphysics? Husserl’s solution is: phenomenological 
construction. 
As it is well-known, Husserl’s assistant, Eugen Fink spoke in the Sixth Cartesian 
Meditation about a “constructive phenomenology”; which aims at the “ultimate and 
highest questions” of metaphysics in a phenomenologically legitimate manner (Fink, 
18 See, e.g. Crisis [1936]: “To bring latent reason to the understanding of its own possibilities and 
thus to bring to insight the possibility of metaphysics as a true possibility—this is the only way to 
put metaphysics or universal philosophy on the strenuous road to realization” (Husserl, 1976b, 13; 
Husserl, 1970b, 15).
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1988, § 7). “Construction,” within the context of phenomenology, means normally a 
phenomenologically illegitimate, ungrounded methodological operation. Despite this, 
there is also the idea of a phenomenologically founded, authentic way of construction. 
Fink emphasizes that the phenomenological construction cannot be arbitrary (Fink, 
1988, 70), it must be founded by evident intuitive givenness. Phenomenological 
constructions must be motivated by earlier, apodictic findings of phenomenology 
(Fink, 1988, 66–70). But much earlier than Fink (Husserl met Fink in 1927) Husserl 
developed and applied the thought and method of phenomenological construction—
as early as the second half of the first decade of the 20th century, during his Gottingen 
years. We can find the conception in the manuscript B II 2  (1907–1910) (Husserl, 
1973a), and in his Lectures on ethics and value theory, 1908–1914 (Husserl, 1988, 170–
185). 
Thus, according to Husserl (as well as, later, according to Fink) an apodictically 
evident, intuitive basis could be articulated for phenomenological constructions. 
Such a foundation could motivate those constructions and determine their direction 
and manner in a similarly evident (though, in this case, non-intuitive) way. Due to 
the intuitive grounding we can construct the non-intuitive context of the absolute 
Being; a context whose apodictic description could yield answers to the traditional 
metaphysical questions in a phenomenologically justified fashion. Constructing the 
invisible, non-intuitive context beyond the limits of possibly visible, Husserl attempts 
to give phenomenologically grounded answers (or at least: to elaborate the questions 
in a strictly phenomenological manner) to the basic problems of classical metaphysics: 
such as the immortality (or mortality) of the soul, the existence of God, the ultimate 
and highest ethical norms and values. 
The construction finally aims at the entire Being: the Absolute, which, in Husserl’s 
description, is an open totality, (cf. Husserl, 1973b, 378–386) (especially: 386). The 
Absolute is an essentially processual and historical reality, whose most essential aspect 
is its originally divine (göttliche) nature, or God itself. According to Husserl, God is the 
motor of every development, and an idea of absolute knowledge and good (Husserl, 
1988). Husserl characterizes the individual, finite souls as “transcendental substances” 
(C-Manuscripts, Husserl, 2006, 176–177); which (who) are finite and concrete modes 
of access of Absolute to itself; which (who) are finite and fixed points of view of the 
Absolute, within the open totality of Being. The particular, finite transcendental 
substances, the individual monads (and their relationships, communities) make 
God’s existence and functioning concrete. God, in Husserl’s view, is an absolute ideal 
of perfection, but not just that; on the other hand, S/He is a very concrete person too, 
Who is working and living through the single monads and the universal community 
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of monads19. God has a first person’s access to all individual experiences of every 
single monad (cf. Husserl, 2014, 168)20.
The exact and detailed reconstruction of Husserl’s phenomenological meta-
physics, with regard to his contextualist theory of truth, would exceed the limits of 
this paper. Here I only wanted to present some of its most important results. But every 
insight concerning the nature of soul and God takes place within the ultimate, all-em-
bracing context of the Absolute; whose unfolding is an infinite process (and which is 
itself an infinite process too), and regarding whom every new insight and discovery 
recontextualize and reinterpret the earlier ones. 
SUMMARY
This paper has two main, strongly connected theses. Firstly, Husserl’s episte-
mology (and also his ontology and metaphysics) could be interpreted in a contex-
tualist way. Secondly, this point of his philosophy offers a possibly fruitful field of 
dialogue with contemporary analytic philosophy, in particular with epistemological 
contextualism. The main parts of the essay deal with a contextualist interpretation of 
Husserl’s ideas.
In Husserl’s philosophy every perception, experience, scientific and philosoph-
ical insight involves an open manifold of internal and external horizons (contexts). 
We see to newer and newer horizons and contexts, which—in turn—do not relativise 
entirely the earlier experiences and evident judgements, only limit their meaning and 
validity. Husserl rejected relativism to the end of his life, but in my interpretation, he 
successfully managed to find a middle way between dogmatism and radical relativ-
ism, due to his contextualist theory of knowledge and being. 
19 On this problematic I highly recommend the book of Lee Chun Lo (Lo, 2008).
20 „Natürlich kann das All-Ich, das alle Ichs in sich und alle Wirklichkeit in sich und nichts außer 
sich hat, nicht wie ein empirisches Ich gedacht werden. Es ist unendliches Leben, unendliche Liebe, 
unendlicher Wille; sein unendliches Leben ist eine einzige Tätigkeit; und da es unendliche Erfül-
lung ist, <ist es>unendliches Glück. Alles Leid, alles Unglück, allen Irrtum lebt Gott in sich nach; 
und nur dadurch, dass er es im strengsten Sinne mitlebt, mitfühlt, kann er seine Endlichkeit, sein 
Nichtseinsollen überwinden in der unendlichen Harmonie, zu der es da ist.Gott ist überall, Gottes 
Leben lebt in allem Leben.“ [“Of course we should not think of this universal I—who embraces ev-
ery I-s and reality in himself—as an empirical I. He is infinite life, infinite love and infinite will. His 
infinite life is the only activity; and because he is infinite fulfilment, he is also infinite happiness. God 
himself also experiences every suffering, every misfortune, every mistake; and only because he lives 
in others, and he feels with others, can he overcome his finitude, his not-necessary-being in the 
infinite harmony, for which he exists. God is everywhere, God’s life lives in every life”] (Husserl, 2014, 
168).
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In this way the philosophical Absolute proves to be the ultimate context, thus 
also the context of the “ultimate and highest questions.” This philosophical Absolute 
is nothing else but an organic, dynamic process (of knowing and Being), and an in-
finitely open horizon, which we explore only in an inadequate way. We experience 
and know only some of its finite and limited parts and moments. Nevertheless, in this 
inadequacy we experience and know it (the Absolute) in an apodictic manner. This 
Absolute is the context of the final questions of metaphysics also.
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